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1.6. A r m  1 
An analysis was made of the legal feasibility of proposed legislation 
intended to deal with drinking drivers who do not meet the legal standard for 
alcohol intoxication, but who commit hazardous traffic violations while their 
blood alcohol concentration (BAC) is high enough to increase the risk of traffic 
crash involvement. The combination of alcohol involvement and a hazardous 
violation would be classified as a "traffic offense aggravated by alcohol." 
Convicted offenders would receive increased sanctions, alternative sanctions 
(such as mandatory attendance at an alcohol-education program), or both. 
Examination of current law revealed that the proposed legislation would be 
constitutional in principle. However, chemical testing of drivers could be 
compelled only if there existed probable cause to arrest for a drinking-driving 
offense. In addition, enacting the proposed legislation would require 
substantial changes in existing state implied-consent and drinking-driving 
laws; for that reason, practical and potential constraints might be encountered. 
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
This is one of a se t  of volumes concerned with the legal constraints 
that can arise in conjunction with the  implementation of highway crash 
countermeasures. It is specifically concerned with proposed legislation 
that creates a class of Traffic Offenses Aggravated by Alcohol (TOAA). 
-4 TOAA, as conceived by i ts  proponents, is a hazardous traffic violation 
committed by a driver whose blood alcohol concentration (BAC) is high 
enough that  he poses an increased risk of a traffic crash, yet is not high 
e n o u g h  t o  p r e s u m e  him l e g a l l y  i n t o x i c a t e d  u n d e r  c u r r e n t  
driving-while-intoxicated (DwI) statutes.  It is proposed that  TOAA 
violators would receive sanctions that  more closely correspond to  the 
crash risk created by their driving behavior. 
The research and analysis leading to  the preparation of this volume 
was conduc ted  by s t a f f  of the Policy Analysis Division of the The 
University of Michigan Highway Safety Research Institute (HSRI) for the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) under Contract 
Number DOT-HS-7-01536. 
1.1 Purpose of Volume 
Many of the legal issues that  might constrain the implementation of 
TOAA l e~s l a t i on  as well as other countermeasure programs are  rooted in 
basic aspects of the Amer~can  legal system, and often involve complex 
issues of U.S. constitutional law and U.S. Supreme Court interpretations 
of t h a t  law.  Thus, any discussion of legal Issues and the potential 
constraints they impose must deal with previling constitutional principles. 
However ,  to  t r ea t  the material in a rigorous legal manner would be 
beyond the scope of this paper. It is not designed t o  provide l ega l  
advice .  Rather ,  i t  is designed for use by public safety officials and 
highway safety planners as a guide that  will permit them to  identify 
problem a r e a s  in coun t e rmeasu re  program implementation. Once 
identified, these problems can be discussed with legal counsel. 
Within this context ,  the purpose of this volume is to provide a brief 
but relatively comprehensive review of the legal constraints that  might be 
encountered in enacting TOAA legislation. It is designed to: identify 
important legal issues; show how they  might  a r i s e ;  e s t i m a t e  t h e i r  
significance as constraints on the TOAA countermeasure; suggest methods 
that might be employed to resolve those constraints; and assess the legal 
feasibility of this countermeasure. 
1.2 Purpose of the TOAA Countermeasure 
Familiarity with current  DWI legislation and the  risk posed by the 
drinking driver are essential to  an understanding of the  proposed TOAA 
legislation. Therefore,  current  DWI laws a r e  discussed here in light of 
the relationship between drinking and the traffic crash risk. 
A number of studies have shown that a drinking driver's probability of 
traffic crash involvement, relat ive to  the  nondrinking driver, increases 
sha rp ly  a s  his  BAC increases  (Borkenstein e t  al. 1964; Huntley and 
Centeybear 1974; Huntley and Perrine 1971; Seehafer, Huff man, and Kinzie 
1968; Coldwell e t  al. 1958). These studies have also shown that a driver 
poses an increased crash risk a t  BACs below ,1096 w/v, the level a t  which 
most states presume a driver to be legally intoxicated. 
Existing DFVI (1) statutes vary considerably from one s t a t e  to  another,  
even though all se t  quanti tat ive BAC levels that define drinking-driving 
offenses. The most common var ie ty  of DWI s t a t u t e  e s t a b l i s h e s  a 
llpresumptionll of intoxication a t  .lo% w/v (2). A judge or jury ordinarilv 
will find a driver with a BAC of ,1096 or above guilty of DWI; however, 
when the chemical t e s t  results a r e  not accompanied by evidence that a 
driver's consumption of alcohol materially af fected driving ability, then 
the driver might be found not guilty. DWI statutes also typically set a 
lower BAC level, such as .05% w/v (3) ,  above which a judge or jury may 
find the driver guilty of DWI if other evidence of impairment is present. 
BAC levels in the .05-.lo% range must be accompanied by other evidence 
tha t  the driver's consumption of alcohol resulted in impairment of driv~ng 
capability for the driver to be found guilty. 
There a r e  two principal variations to the typical DWI statute described 
here. The f i rs t  variation, which has been adopted by twelve states (4, 
established a so-called per se definition of DWI: a driver whose BAC IS 
determined to  be above a gven level (usually .lo% w/v) has committed an 
offense, irrespective of whether alcohol consumption had in fac t  affected 
his driving ability. The second variation, which is found In several states 
(5), is the establishment of two drinking-driving offenses: t h e  DWI 
o f f e n s e ;  plus a lesser offense, which is given various t i t les such as 
'?driving while impaired." Creation of two offenses allows judges or jurles 
I n  marginal cases to  find a driver guilty of a less serious drinking-driving 
offense instead of finding him not guilty of DWI. 
Thus, current drinking-driving legislation sharply limits the ability of 
police or prosecuting at torneys to  deal with high-risk drivers in t h e  
.05--10% BAC range. Thls is so for two reasons. First, most state laws 
require evidence of alcohol impairment in addition to  the  BAC results to  
prove a driver guilty of DWI. This requirement tends to discourage police 
officers from even arrest ing a driver for DWI unless he displays gross 
s igns  of impa i rmen t ;  th i s  in tu rn  a s  a p r a c t i c a l  m a t t e r  focuses 
enforcement attention on drivers with BACs well above ,1096 (Belardo and 
Zink 1975; Mason and Dubowski 1974). Second, the requirement that  
additional evidence of impairment accompany BAC results bet ween .05% 
and -10% makes a DWI conviction unlikely for drivers in this range. This 
is because in these cases the driver's intoxication cannot be inferred from 
t h e  t e s t  r e su l t s  a lone ;  r a t h e r ,  i t  must be proved a t  t r ial  by the 
prosecution. Therefore ,  under t h e  c u r r e n t  laws of most s t a t e s ,  a 
prosecutor or police officer is likely to deal with a driver with a BAC 
level below .lo% in one of three ways: prosecute for DWI and face  the 
strong probability of a not-guilty verdict; prosecute for a traffic violation 
not related to alcohol (such as reckless driving); or take no enforcement 
action. 
TOAA leg i s la t ion  a t t empts  to remedy the difficulty, imposed by 
existing legislation, of dealing with high-risk drlnking drivers.  This 
proposed legislation would first of all establish a threshold BAC level, 
most likely .05%, which would be a per s e  level. Driving with a BAC 
level above the threshold, combined with a hazardous (moving) traffic 
v io l a t i on ,  would be  def ined  as an offense "aggravated by a l c ~ h o l . ~ ?  
Conviction of this new offense would subject the offender t o  increased or 
different  sanctions, The concept of this approach is not novel; a number 
of s t a tes  have in e f fec t  created offenses aggravated by alcohol with 
respect  to  drivers who cause fa ta l  t raf f ic  crashes: in these states the 
intoxicated, at-fault driver is guilty of a more serious offense and faces 
more severe sanctions than the unintoxicated at-fault driver (6). 
In contrast with current DWI statutes, the TOAA statute would require 
the prosecution only to  prove tha t  the driver committed a hazardous 
traffic violation, and that his BAC was, at the time of the offense, above 
the  s ta tu tory  limit.  It would not be necessary under the proposed TOAA 
s t a t u t e  t o  es tab l i sh  t h a t  impa i rmen t  in f a c t  r e s u l t e d  f rom t h e  
consumption of alcohol. 
1.3 TOAA Employment Scenarios 
It is believed that  the  most useful employment scenarios would be 
provided by a scheme based on how drivers would be tested for BAC, and 
what kinds of sanctions would be imposed on convicted TOAA offenders, 
When t raf f ic  v io l a to r s  a r e  s topped  by t h e  po l ice ,  two  t e s t i n g  
procedures are possible: 
any d r ~ v e r  who commits a hazardous t raf f ic  violation 
would be required under the TOAA statute to submit t o  a 
BAC test; or 
any d r ive r  who commits a hazardous t raf f ic  violation 
would be required under the s ta tu te  t o  submit, provided 
the arresting police officer suspects alcohol impairment. 
Once a t raf f ic  law violator has been convicted of a TOAA, t h r e e  
variations are possible with respect to sanctioning: 
a t h e  conv i c t ed  TOAA o f f ende r  is s a n c t i o n e d  m o r e  
severely--by the  court ,  the driver licensing authority, or 
both-than a driver who committed the  same hazardous 
violation not aggravated by alcohol; 
the convicted offender is sanctioned differently--such as 
being sentenced to a t tend alcohol safety classes-than a 
driver who committed the same hazardous violation not 
aggravated by alcohol; or 
t h e  conv i c t ed  o f f ende r  r e ce ive s  both increased and 
alternative sanctions. 
1.4 Content of Volume 
The remainder of this volume is organized into three sections. Section 
2.0 identifies and discusses t he  l ega l  issues t h a t  can  a r i s e  in t h e  
employment of TOAA legislation, the constraints that der~ve from such 
legal issues, and the significance of those constraints .  Sec t i on  3.0 
discusses approaches that  can be employed to resolve those constraints. 
Section 4.0 discusses the general l ega l  f e a s ib i l i t y  of t h e  proposed 
l e g i s l a t i o n  in  l i g h t  of t h e  i d e n t i  f l e d  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  and makes 
recommendations concerning the enactment of TOAA le~sla t ion.  

2.0 IDENTIFICATION AND DISCUSSION OF THE LEGAL 
ISSUES AND POTENTIAL LEGAL CONSTRAINTS 
ASSOCIATED WITH TOAA LEGISLATION 
2.1 General 
Three distinct sets  of legal issues can arise out of the employment of 
TOAA legislation. The f i rs t  se t  is concerned with the constitutional 
authority to enact and enforce a TOAA statute. The second set of issues 
is concerned with the detection and identification of drivers suspected of 
violating the TOAA statute and deals primarily with compulsory testing of 
drivers for BAC. The third se t  of issues concerns  sanc t ion ing  of 
convicted TOAA violators. 
The purpose of this section of the document is to identify the legal 
issues that might arise, set out the legal constraints that can develop out 
of these issues, and estimate the significance of these constraints on the 
employment of TOAA legslation. Approaches to remove or resolve these 
constraints are discussed in Section 3.0. 
2.2 Constitutional Authority to Enact TOAA Legislation 
TOAA legislation, unlike countermeasure devices and systems, involves 
the lawmaking process itself and is therefore subject to constitutional 
requirements governing the tvpe of laws that  legislatures may enact. 
Three fundamental constitutional issues are  applicable: t he  s t a t e ' s  
authority, under its police power, to deal with drinking drivers and to test 
them for BAC; the reasonableness of TOAA legislation under the Due 
Process  Clause;  and whether  legislation creating a class of TOAA 
offenders vlolates the equal protection guarantee. 
2.2.1 Authority to Deal with Drinking Drivers. It is established that 
states have the authority to deal with the crash risk posed by drlnking 
drivers. Thls authority derives from the states' so-called police powers, 
which include powers to legslate for the public health, safety,  morals, or 
welfare (7). Under the statesf police powers, special Interests have been 
recognized In highway s a f e t y  (81, and t h e s e  i n t e r e s t s  inc lude  t h e  
elim~nation of drinking drivers from the hlghways (9). 
States not only have power to take actlon against drlnking drivers, but 
they may also use appropriate investigating tools to identify those drlvers 
who, because of thelr drinking, create an increased risk of traffic crashes. 
Thus, s t a tes  have been permitted to use chemical test results as evidence 
of intoxication (101, to  make chemical test ing compulsory by means of 
~mplied-consent statutes (111, and to make evldentlal use of test results by 
defining drinking-driving offenses In terms of BAC (12). 
The unanimous trend of courts  has been t o  uphold implied-consent 
legislation in ~ r ~ n c i p l e .  It should be noted, however, tha t  the proposed 
TOAA s t a t u t e  would supplement or modlfy existing ~mplied-consent  
legislation. Speclfic legal issues associated wlth the relationship bet  ween 
TOAA and rmpl~ed consent legslation are discussed below. 
2.2.2 The Due Process of Law Requ~rement. TOAA leglslation, being 
an  e x e r c l s e  of t h e  s t a t e ' s  po l ice  powers, enjoys a presumption of 
const i tu t ional~ty;  unless leglslation is clearly unrelated to  the  state 's  
Interest  in highway safe ty ,  or infringes fundamental constitutional rights, 
courts will uphold ~t  as constitut~onal (13). 
Studles showing a relationship between BAC in the .05 to -10% range 
and an increased rlsk of traffic crashes (Borkenstein e t  al. 1964; Huntley 
and Centeybear 1974; Huntley and Perrlne 1971; Seehafer, Huffman, and 
Kinzie 1968; Coldwell e t  al. 19581, comblned wlth the  presumption of 
constitutionalitv given statutes by courts (14), virtually assure that TOAA 
1eg;lslatlon would be upheld as a reasonable means of promoting highway 
safety.  In addition, ~t  is highly unlikely that TO-4-4 legslatlon would be 
found offenslve to any fundamental right. Although l t  has been argued 
t h a t  l eg i s l a t i on  r e s t r i c t i n g  the  use of motor vehicles Infringes the 
fundamental Ifrlght to travel,If the courts have disagreed, holding that  the 
right to operate a motor vehlcle IS a lfqualifledll one that may be subject 
to appropriate regulations (15). Finally, opponents of T O A A  might argue 
tha t  such legislat~on overbroad in that it punlshes unlntoxlcated as well as 
i n t o x i c a t e d  d r ive rs .  This argument ,  however, has so far  not been 
accepted by courts (16). In sum, it is unlikely that TOAA legislation w i l l  
encounter any constraints under the Due Process Clause. 
2.2.3 The Equal Protection Guarantee. TOAA legislation establishes a 
classification of drivers, based on BAC, and for that reason it may be 
challenged as a violation of the  equal p ro t ec t i on  g u a r a n t e e .  T h a t  
guarantee generally requires that  leglslative classifications be reasonably 
related to some important government interest. 
When leglslative classifications involve such vsuspectll criteria as race 
or reliaon, or involve fundamental rlghts such as voting or marriage, 
c o u r t s  wil l  s t r i n g e n t l y  review them and require the government to  
demonstrate their necessity (Note 1969) (17). When neither a fundamental 
r i gh t  nor a suspect classification is Involved, all  tha t  is required t o  
support a classification scheme is a rational relationship to  some valid 
s t a t e  o b j e c t i v e  (18). In t h e  c a s e  of TOAA legislation, no suspect 
c lass i f ica t~ons  would be created.  Nor would fundamen ta l  r i gh t s  be  
affected;  as pointed out earl ier ,  the right to operate a motor vehicle is 
neither 71fundamenta111 in i tself ,  nor is i t  equivalent t o  the  fundamental 
constitutional right to travel. Therefore, analysls of TOAA by courts will 
center on the state objective served by such laws, and on the relationship 
of the TOAA class~fications to achieving that objective. 
As polnted out earl ier ,  courts have recognized the  importance o f  
eliminating drinking drivers from the highways, some courts have, in fact, 
characterized this interest as "c~rnpell ing~~ (19). Courts, recognizing this 
in teres t ,  have upheld a number of statutory schemes that call for special 
t rea tment  to  the drinking driver ( 2 0 ) .  Given t ha t  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  o f  
TOAA--reduction of t h e  c r a sh  rlsk--is a valid one, and given the 
relationship between BAC levels between . 0 5 %  and .lo% and increased 
t r a f f ~ c  crash risk, i t  IS highly unlikely that  courts would find that the 
classifications created by TOAA legislation violate the  equal protection 
guarantee. 
2 . 2 . 4  Summary. States have author~tv both to enact TOAA legislation 
and t o  e n f o r c e  such legislation by test ing drivers for BAC. T0.4A 
legislation may challenged as a violation of the  due p roce s s  of law 
r e q u i r e m e n t  or t h e  equal  protection guarantee; however, i t  is very 
unlikely that such challenges would succeed. This being the  case,  a TOAA 
s t a tu t e  will not be declared unconstitutional on its face. It is, however, 
possible tha t  constitutional constraints  could be e n c o u n t e r e d  in t h e  
enforcement of an otherwise valid TOAA statute. This is discussed in the 
next section. 
2.3 Constraints on the Detection and Identification of TOAA Offenders 
Even though challenges t o  TOAA legislation itself a r e  unlikely t o  
succeed, the  enforcement of such legislation might be constrained by both 
constitutional provisions and by state statutes governing DWI prosecutions 
in general. Possible legal issues raised by the  enforcement of TOAA 
legislation concern a police officer 's authori ty to  stop veh i c l e s ,  t h e  
officer 's authori tv to  t e s t  drivers for BAC, and the manner of testing 
drivers. 
2.3.1 Authority to  Stop Vehicles. Because a TOA44 violation consists 
of two elements-a hazardous (moving) t raf f ic  violation and driving with 
the  requisite B A C  level--a TOAA arrest would result from a traffic stop 
based on probable cause. Since a police officer may val~dly stop a driver 
who commits an suspected traffic law violation in his presence (21), there 
exist no constitutional barriers to the initial contact  between the  o f f ~ c e r  
and driver. That initial contact may reveal to the officer that the dr~ver 
had been drinking; this in turn may give the  officer  just if icat ion t o  
conduct a BAC test. 
2.3.2 Authority to Test Drivers for BAC. Two alternative procedures 
have been proposed bv which drivers stopped on suspicion of a t raf f ic  
violation would be tested for BAC. These are: flrst, compulsory testing 
of all suspected t raf f lc  offenders; and second, compulsory test ing of 
suspected t ra f f i c  offenders only when there is reason to suspect alcohol 
impairment. 
Two sources of law ac t  as possible constraints on the circumstances 
under which a BAC test may validly be compelled. These are: f irst ,  the 
prohibition, under the U.S. Constitution, of unreasonable searches and 
@ 
s e i zu re s ;  and second,  spec l f i c  r e q u i r e m e n t s  i m p o s e d  by s t  a t e  
implied-consent laws. 
Court decisions have clearly defined compulsory blood testing for BAC 
as a tlsearchfl (22), and the same reasoning also applies to breath test ing 
(23). Therefore, to  be valid, such tes ts  must meet the requirement of 
reasonableness imposed by the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
(24). Specifically, a police officer may not require a driver to submit to a 
BAC test unless he has probable cause to believe that  the driver had 
commit ted  a drinking-drlving offense (25). The level of suspicion is 
equivalent to the level of probable cause necessary to  ar res t  the driver 
for a drinking-drivlng offense (26), whether or not a formal arrest on that 
charge is made. In many s ta tes ,  implied-consent s ta tu tes  that  govern 
BAC test ing requlre a formal arrest  prior to testing; other states have 
imposed the same requirement by means of court decisions (27). Thus, 
whether or not a formal TOAA arres t  is required prior to testlng, it is 
clear that a test cannot be required w~thout some reason to suspect that  
a drinking-driving violation had occurred; therefore, legslation authorlzlng 
compulsory tes ts  for all moving traff lc offenders, wlthou t requiring 
evldence of alcohol impairment, would violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Chemlcal test ing for BAC 1s governed in all s t a t e s  by so-called 
implied-consent statues.  These s ta tu tes  typically provlde that a driver 
has, by his act of operating a vehicle, given his consent to  appropriate 
chemica l  t e s t s  of body fluids to determine hls BAC ( ~ e e d e r  1972). 
Implled-consent s ta tu tes  a re  made effective by imposlng pena l t i e s ,  
typically mandatory license suspension, upon drivers who refuse a valid 
request to submit to a test (28). 
It IS not certain whether ~mplled-consent statutes would govern tests 
In connection wlth TOAA, or whether  they  would apply t o  DWI 
prosecutions only (29).  It 1s possible that  I n  some s ta tes ,  ex~s t i ng  
implled-consent s ta tu tes  would not apply to tes ts  conducted under the 
proposed TOAA leglslatlon. In those s ta tes ,  authority to  test  In the 
absence of an implied-consent law derives from the powers of police 
officers to arrest and search; these powers a r e  required by the  Fourth 
Amendment  t o  be exe r c i s ed  in a reasonable  manner (35). Courts 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement have  
permitted police officers to conduct BAC testing over the tested driver's 
objection (comment 1976) (36), a t  least where no violence or brutality is 
involved (37). 
Even though police officers may test for BAC without the benefit of 
an implied-consent statute and without the  tested driver's acquiesence, 
such t e s t i n g  runs coun t e r  t o  t h e  l eg i s l a t i ve  policles reflected i n  
implied-consent legislation. A principal purpose of impl ied-consent  
legislation is to  provide an al ternative,  nonphysical means of forcing 
drivers to submit to tests (comment 1976). While under implied-consent, 
no driver may be tested against his will, a decision not to  submit is 
punished by an a l t e r n a t e  pena l t y ,  namely loss  of l i c e n s e  ( 3 3 ) .  
Implied-consent provisions express a legislative policy that forcible testing 
is an unsatisfactory enforcement t a c t~c .  
Even i f  implied-consent s t a tu tes  govern t e s t ~ n g  of TOAA offenders, 
those statutes may, in some states, grant drivers certain additional rights 
that  are  not requlred by the U.S. Constitution; they rnay also impose 
requirements on oolice officers In addition to the minimum constitutional 
requirements, One common s ta tutory  requirement is that of a formal 
drinking-driving arrest prior to testing: although there  a r e  indicat ions 
that  neither the U.S. nor state constitutions require a formal arrest, most 
states have-as stated before-imposed such a requirement by s t a t u t e  (34) .  
In any event, the equivalent of probable cause to arrest will be required 
as a condition of testing. Other requirements imposed by implied-consent 
legislation include, for ~nstance: permitting the driver to consult with his 
attorney before deciding whether to submit to  a tes t  (35); offering the 
tested driver a choice of tests (36); and prohibit~ng the officer who made 
the drinking-driving arres t  from also administering the BAC tes t  (37). 
While these provisions ralse legal issues that are no different in the case 
of TOAA than in the case of DWI legwlation, they may impose practical  
constraints on the testing process. 
2.4 Constraints on the Sanctioning of Conv~cted TOAA Offenders 
Three alternative schemes have been proposed for the sanctioning of 
drivers convicted of a TOAA: f i rs t ,  convicted TOAA offenders would 
receive more severe punishment than unimpaired moving t raf f ic  violators; 
second, convicted offenders would be sentenced to attend alcohol safety 
classes or to  part icipate in some rehabilitation program;  and t h i rd ,  
conv i c t ed  o f f ende r s  would r ece ive  both additional and al ternative 
sanctions. Two constitutional guarantees a re  likely to  be raised against 
sentencing of TOAA offenders: the equal protection guarantee; and the 
requirement that conditions of probation be reasonable. 
2.4.1 The Equal Protection Guarantee. TOAA legislation might be 
cha l l enged  on t h e  g r o u n d s  t h a t  m o r e  s e v e r e  p u n i s h m e n t  f o r  
alcohol-aggravated offenses is not reasonably related to their nature and 
severity. However, as pointed out earlier, it is likely that  a court would 
consider the proposed TOAA legislation a rational means of dealing with 
the added crash risk posed by the moving traff ic violator who had been 
drinking. 
It should be pointed out that  classifications of traff ic offenses are 
widely used in the law. For example, reckless driving earns the offender 
heavier fines and more violation points than careless driving (381, fines 
for speeding violations are often based on the number of miles per hour 
above the posted speed limit (39), and, as mentioned earlier,  several 
states have created two degrees of drinking-dr~ving offenses and defined 
them in terms of BAC. More generally, the law recognizes different 
degrees of offenses and prescribes punishments accordingly (40). 
Because classification of offenses by degree does not in  itself violate 
the equal protection guarantee, and because there is evidence show~ng 
that  drivers with BAC levels between .05% and .lo% pose a comparatively 
greater crash risk than drivers with BAC levels below . 0 5 % ,  i t  is likely 
that  courts would uphold differential punishment of TOAA offenders as 
constitutional. 
2.4.2 Reasonab l enes s  of P roba t i on  Conditions. Probation is a  
sanctioning process by which a convicted offender is granted conditional 
l iberty as an alternative to incarceration (~i l l inger ,  Kerper, and Cromwell 
1976, pp. 14-15). It is relevant t o  the  santioning of convicted TOAA 
offenders for two reasons: f i rs t ,  i t  is a  means of channeling offenders 
into educat~on and rehabilitation programs; and second, the laws of all  but 
two s t a t e s  make drinking-drivlng offenses punishable by a jail sentence 
(41). Assuming that a  court has the requisite authority to  grant  probation, 
t h e  chief legal Issue is the requirement tha t  probation conditions be 
reasonable. By "reasonableu is meant that conditions be related ei ther t o  
the  offender 's  criminality or to his rehabilitation, that they be possible to 
carry out, and that they do not unduly res t r ic t  the offender's personal 
l iberty (42). Requiring an alcohol-involved traffic offender to participate 
in a rehabilitative program directed a t  his drinking behavior would likely 
m e e t  t h e  t e s t  of reasonableness, a t  least  when the program avoids 
compulsory and highly intrusive medical or psychological treatment (43). 
2.5 Summary 
TOAA l eg i s l a t i on ,  while susceptible t o  legal challenges based on 
several fundamental cons t i t u t i ona l  r i gh t s ,  is unl lkely  t o  be  found 
unconstitutional on i ts  face.  The separate  treatment of moving traffic 
offenders who had been drinking IS likely to be upheld as a valid exerise 
of the s ta te ' s  power t o  legislate in the interests of highway safety, On 
the  other hand, the  constitutional prohibit ion aga in s t  unreasonab le  
searches,  plus the  specific requirements of state implied-consent statutes, 
may restrlct the authority of police officers to  require BAC test ing of 
suspected TO AA violators. Under the Fourth Amendment, drivers cannot 
be forced to submit to a chem~cal test unless there  is a t  least  probable 
c a u s e  t o  suspec t  that  the d r ~ v e r  is impaired by alcohol. Thus, any 
provision in the proposed legislation that authorizes test ing of all  moving 
t r a f f i c  offenders would be unconst i tu t~onal .  Whether ~mplied-consent 
legislation governs testing of suspected TOAA violstors or not, i t  raises 
legal issues af fect ing the  proposed TOAA legislation. If implied-consent 
laws do apply, their various requirements-such as attorney consultation or 
choice of tests--could impose practical  constraints on testing. On the 
other hand, if those laws do not apply, pollce officers have no means of 
compelling an unwilling suspect to take a test other than using physical 
force-an enforcement tactic not favored by state legislatures. 

3.0 APPROACHES TO CONSTRAINT RESOLUTION 
Two constraints t h a t  have been lden t l f i ed  In Sec t ion  2.0--the 
requirement of probable cause and the applicablllty of imphed-consent 
legslation-might pose barriers to  the employment of TOAA legislatlon. 
It is the purpose of this section to discuss approaches that  might be 
employed to resolve those constraints. 
3.1 The Requirement of Probable Cause as a Precondition to Testing 
Chemical testlng has been characterized as a 'lsearchfl governed by the 
Fourth Amendment requirement of reasonableness. As a result a police 
officer must have a t  least   rob able cause to  belleve that  a drlver is 
Impaired by alcohol before requiring him to submlt to a chemlcal test for 
BAC. This requirement precludes enforcement s t r s t  egies calling for the 
t e s t i n g  of a l l  moving traff lc violators. However, this constraint IS 
relatively slight, since the commlsslon of a moving traff ic v ~ o l a t i o n  
coupled w ~ t h  an odor of alcohol or other evidence of lmpalrment would, 
under the Fourth Amendment, justify an officer In demanding a BAC test .  
The re fo r e ,  t h e  probable-cause requirement does not pose a serious 
constraint to the proposed TOAA legislatlon. 
3 . 2  The Appl icat ion of Implied-Consent Legislation to Testlng of 
Susoected TOA,4 Offenders 
The primary purpose of existing implled-consent leglslatlon is the 
detection and ldentificatlon of DWI offenders. Whether these s ta tu tes ,  as 
written, would govern testing of suspected TOAA offenders is not known. 
In s ta tes  whose implied-consent laws do not govern testing i n  TOAA 
cases, compulsory BAC testing could conceivably be carrled out under the 
general Fourth Amendment requirement that  searches be 'lreasonable.lf 
However, wlthout the threat  of mandatory license suspension as a means 
of obtaining a driver's consent to BAC testing, ~ o l l c e  officers faced with 
an uncooperative TOAA suspect would have to choose between foregoing 
chemical  tes t  results as evidence of guilt or uslng physical force to 
conduct BAC tests. 
In s t a tes  where implied-consent legislation does govern test ing of 
suspected TOAA offenders, enforcement problems could r e s u l t  f rom 
s t a t u t e s  t h a t  g r an t  dr ivers  rights such as a choice of t e s t s  or the 
opportunitv to consult with an attorney prior to the test. Although these 
add i t i ona l  protections would not by themselves preclude test ing of 
suspected TOAA offenders, they could generate constraints i n  the form of 
added t ime and expense, and may divert officers' attention from more 
seriously impaired drlvers. Such constraints, however, are practical rather 
than legal. 
There exists a simple means of avoiding these potential problems: 
amendlng existing implied-consent statutes so that  they govern suspected 
TOAA offenses. None of the constitutional chellenges originally raised 
against existing implied-consent legislation would likely succeed against 
the new implied-consent provisions; this is because the unsafe driving 
conduct addressed by TOAA legislation poses crash risks quite similar to  
those now created by DWI offenders. 
4.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A TOAA statute would l~kely contain the following provisions: 
A t r a f f i c  o f fense  aggravated by alcohol (ToAA) IS a 
hazardous t ra f f~c  vlolat~on comm~t t ed  by a d r ~ v e r  whose 
blood alcohol concentration lnd~ca tes  an lmpalrment of 
drlvlng ab~lity; 
A BAC l e v e l  of . 0 5 %  w/v  or  g r e a t e r ,  ~ n d ~ c a t e s  
~mpalrment of drlving abil~ty; 
A d r ~ v e r  val~dly  stopped by a pollee offlcer on suspicion 
of a moving t r a f f ~ c  vlola t~on mav be tes ted  for  BAC 
under the ~mpl~ed-consent  s ta tu te ,  provided the off~cer 
has probable cause to belleve that the d r ~ v e r  is ~mpal red  
by alcohol; 
A d r ~ v e r  who refuses a valld request to take a BAC test 
shall, under t he  ~mp l l ed -consen t  s t a t u t e ,  r e ce ive  a 
mandatory l~cense suspension; and 
A d r ~ v e r  conv~c ted  of a TOAA sha l l ,  In addl t lon t o  
rece lv lng  any penal sanc t~ons  or v~olat lon po~nts :  (a)  
attend alcohol safety classes; (b) receive a d d ~ t ~ o n a l  penal 
sanctions or v~olat ion polnts on account of h ~ s  alcohol 
impairment; or (c) both. 
Although t h e  constraints  i d e n t ~ f ~ e d  In S e c t ~ o n  2.0 pose potential 
barrlers to the ~mplernentat~on of TOAA legls la t~on,  all of them can be 
resolved through appropriate statutory amendment. The most Important 
of these would be to amend ~mplied-consent laws so that they govern the 
testing of suspected TOAA offenders as well as suspected DWI offenders. 
Flnally, in states that grant dr~vers such r~ghts as attorney consultation or 
c h o ~ c e  of tes ts  i n  connect~on w ~ t h  BAC testing, TOAA law enforcement 
could be more costly and t ~ m e - c o n s u m ~ n g .  Appropriate s t a t u t o r y  
amendments to facilitate testlng of TOAA offenders m~ght be considered. 
The remaining b a r r ~ e r s  to the enactment of a TOAA s t a t u t e  a r e  
political and practical  in nature. For example, the adoption of per se 
DWI s ta tutes  so far  by less than one-quarter of the s t a t e s ,  and t h e  
relat ive rari tv of s t a tes  having levels of two drinking-dr~ving offenses, 
suggest that TOAA legislation might not readily be accepted by many 
s t a t e  legis la tures .  I t  is also possible that  TOAX s ta tu tes  would, i f  
enacted, provide prosecutors with another plea-bargaining tool by creating 
a class of alcohol-related offenses less serlous than DWI. These issues 
require further examimation as the countermeasure concept is developed. 
As noted, they are policy considerations and not legal issues. 
Thus, we conclude that  the concept of a TOAA s t a tu t e  is a legally 
feasible countermeasure approach for dealing with drinking and driving. It 
should be pointed out that TOAA legislation may encounter political or 
p r a c t i c a l  cons t r a in t s ;  these,  however, a r e  bevond the  scope of this 
volume. Note that this analysis has addressed neither the  political nor 
the practical feasibility of TOAA legislation as this IS the subject of 
analyses by NHTSA and by other NHTSA contractors. 
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21. 5 AM. JUR. 2d Arrest  -§§ 26, 28 (1962). I t  shou ld  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  
t h e  p o w e r  t o  m a k e  w a r r a n t l e s s  a r r e s t s  f o r  t r a f f ~ c  o f f e n s e s  IS 
generally granted by s ta tute .  
22. S c h r n e r b e r  v. C a l l f o r n l a ,  384 U.S. 757 (1966); - S t a t e  v. Howard, 193 
Neb. 45, 225 N.W.2d 391 (1975) [applying r e a s o n i n g  of S c h m e r b e r l  ; 
S t a t e  v. Kroen ig ,  274 Wis. 266, 79 N.W.2d 810 (1956) [declded on -
s t a t e  constitutional grounds prior t o  Schmerberl . 
23. - S t a t e  v. M e c a r t h y ,  123 N.J. Super. 513, 303 A.2d 626 ( ~ s s e x  County 
Ct. 1973); - S t a t e  v. Osburn, 13 Or. App. 92, 508 P.2d 837 (1973); 
Commonwealth v. Quarles, 229 Pa. Super. 363, 324 A.2d 452 (1974) 
( p l u r a l ~ t y  o p ~ n ~ o n ) ;  - State  v. Driver, 59 WIS. 2d 35, 207 N.W.2d 850, 
854 (1973). 
24. U.S. CONST. amend. W .  
4 
25. In Schmerber v. C a l ~ f o r n ~ a ,  384 U.S. 757, 768-69 (1966), the U.S. 
Supreme Court appeared to requlre both a va l~d  arrest and probable 
cause before a d r ~ v e r  could be r e q u ~ r e d  t o  subm~t  to a chem~cal  
test. In Cupp - v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), the  Court p e r m ~ t t e d  
the  taking of f f h ~ g h l y  evanescentr1 evidence w~thout  a formal arrest 
where there ex~s ted  probable cause t o  make the  a r res t .  R e a d ~ n g  
Schmerber and Cupp together  therefore  provides just~f~cat ion for 
prear res t  chemical  tes t lng  of a driver where there  is p robab le  
cause t o  a r r e s t  t he  d r ~ v e r  for DWI. This resul t  was reached in 
State v. Oevering, - Minn. ---, 268 N.W.2d 68 (1978). See also, -
Sta t e ,  Department  of P u b l ~ c  Safety v. Grovum, 297 Mlnn. 66, 209 
N.W.2d 788 (1973) [licensing authori ty  cannot punish dr iver  f o r  
r e f u s ~ n g  t o  t a k e  chemical test unless officer had probable cause to 
suspect DwII; and Commonwealth v. Quarles ,  229 Pa. Super. 363, 
324 A.2d 452 (1974) ( p l u r a l ~ t y  opln~on) [requir~ng probable cause to 
conduct on-the-spot BAC test of drlver; but requlrlng formal  a r res t  
t o  t ake  d r ~ v e r  Into custody] ; but see, State v. M~tchell, 245 So.2d 
618 (Fla. 1971) [apparently requlrlng a s h o w ~ n g  less than probable 
cause t o  j u s t ~ f y  a t e s t ]  ; and People v. Graser, 393 N.Y.S.2d 1009 
(Amherst Town Court 1977) [poss~bly  requiring less than probable 
cause] .  Most states, however, st111 requlre a formal arrest prlor to 
DWI testlng; - see, the statutes and cases c ~ t e d  In note 27 below. 
26. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1365 (4th ed. rev. 1968) states that 
have llprobable cause,lf "probable cause to belleve,!' and "reasonable 
cause to beheveff all have equivalent legal meanings. 
27. In many s ta tes ,  the implied-consent statute explicitly requires an 
arrest prior to  administering a BAC tes t ;  -7 see e.g., CAL. VEH. 
CODE S 13353(a) (west 1971) [the test 17shall be incldent to a lawful 
ar res tM];  ILL. A N N .  STAT. ch. 9 5  1/2, 5 11-50l.l(a) ( S m i t h - ~ u r d  
Supp. 1979) [!'as an incident to and following hls lawful arrestT7] ; 
and MICH. COMP. LAWS A N N .  257.625c(l)(a) (1977) [arrest  for 
driving while intoxicated or impaired made a condition of testing]. 
In a number of other s ta tes ,  courts have suppressed BAC t e s t  
results a t  t r ial  because the statutory arrest requirement was not 
observed; the following cases a re  typical: - Sta te  v. Richerson, 87 
N.M. 437, 535 P.2d 644 ( ~ t .  App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 450, 535 
P.2d 657 (1975); - State v. Wetherell, 82 Wash. 2d 865, 514 P.2d 1069 
(1968); and S t a t e  -v. Byers -9 224 S.E.2d 7 2 6  (w. Va. 1976). Cases 
dealing with the arrest  requirement are co l l ec ted  in S t a t e  v .  
Oevering, --- illinn. ---, 268 N.W.2d 68, 74-75 (1978) (dissenting 
opinion). 
28. - See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 9 257.625f(3) (1977). 
29.  UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE S ll-902.l(a)  sup^. I1 1976) provides for 
the introduction of chemical test  results in  !?any civil or criminal 
action or proceeding71 arislng out of acts  alleged to  have been 
committed by the suspected intoxicated driver. Not all s t a tes  
follow the UVC approach. Many states permit the introduction of 
chemical test  results in criminal prosecutions only; - see, e.g,, MINN. 
STAT. ANN. 169.121(2) (West Supp. 1979). Some s ta tes  restr lct  
the use of test  results to DWI prosecution only; - see,  e.g., ILL. 
ANN. STAT, ch. 95 112, 5 11-501.l(c) (Sml th -~u rd  Supp. 1979). The 
issue of whether BAC tes t  results can be admitted in prosecutions 
of vehicular-homicide and other non-DWI cases is also discussed i n  
Annot., 16 A.L.R. 3d 748 (1967). 
30. Schmerber v, California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
S e e ,  P e o p l e  v. S u p e r i o r  C o u r t  of Kern County, 6 Cal. 3d 757, 493 31. -
P.2d 1145, 100 Cal. Rptr .  281 (1972). 
32. - S e e ,  P e o p l e  v. S u p e r l o r  C o u r t  of Kern Countv, 6 Cal. 3d 757, 493 
P.2d U45, 100 Cal. Rptr .  281 (1972); and Rossell v. C i t v  a n d  C o u n t y  
o f  H o n o l u l u ,  --- H a w .  --- , 5 7 9  P . 2 d  6 6 3  ( 1 9 7 8 ) ;  s e e  a l s o ,  
Commonwealth, Depar tment  of Public Safe ty  - v. Hayden,  4 8 4  S.W.2d 
97 ( ~ y .  1972) (dicta). 
33.  - S e e ,  e.g., MICH. COMP.  LAWS ANN. S S  257.625-257.625g (1977), 
which is t y p ~ c a l  of those s t a t u t e s  t h a t  in e f f e c t  g r a n t  t h e  d r i v e r  a 
W g h t  t o  r e f u s e y '  a c h e m i c a l  t e s t  a n d  choose  a l icense suspension 
~ n s t e a d .  A number of s t a tu t e s ,  however, punish t h e  n o n c o o p e r a t ~ v e  
d r i v e r  b o t h  w a y s ,  b y  i m p o s ~ n g  a l i c e n s e  s u s p e n s i o n  a n d  by 
p e r m i t t i n g  t h e  p r o s e c u t i o n  a t  a DWI t r ~ a l  t o  c o m m e n t  o n  t h e  
d r ive r ' s  r e f u s a l .  R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  s t a t u t e s  imposing such a tldoubleu 
p e n a l t y  I n c l u d e  t h e  f o l l o w ~ n g :  U N I F O R Y  V E H I C L E  C O D E  5 
11.902.l(c) (Supp. II 1976) [ o p t ~ o n a l  provision]; ALA. CODE tlt. 32, S 
5-192(c) (1975); DEL. CODE t ~ t .  21, § 2749 (1974); a n d  IOWA C O D E  
ANN. S 321B.7 (wes t  Supp. 1978-79). 
34. In e l e v e n  s t a t e s  a n d  t h e  D ~ s t r i c t  o f  C o l u m b i a ,  h o w e v e r ,  p o l i c e  
o f f i c e r s  a r e  p e r m i t t e d  t o  administer, under ce r t a ln  circumstances,  
p r e a r r e s t  b r e a t h  t e s t s ,  t h e  p u r p o s e  of  which  a r e  t o  g u i d e  t h e  
o f f i c e r  i n  d e c i d i n g  w h e t h e r  t o  m a k e  a formal  DWI ar res t .  As of 
December 1978, t h e  following "preliminary brea th  t e s t1 '  s t a t u t e s  h a d  
b e e n  e n a c t e d :  FLA.  STAT. 5 322.261(1)(b) (1978); IND. CODE ANN. 
S 9-4-4.5-3 (Burns  Supp.  1978); ME. REV. STAT.  ANN. t i t .  29 ,  S 
1312.11C ( w e s t  Supp.  1978-79); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.121(6) (West 
Supp. 1979); MISS. CODE ANN. S 63-11-5 (1973); NEB. REV. STAT.  9 
39-669.08(3) (1974); N.Y. VEH. & T R A F .  LAW S 1193a ( 7 4 c ~ i n n e y  
 SUP^. 1978-79); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. S 20-16.3 (1978) ;  N.D.  
CENT.  CODE S 39-20-14 (Supp. 1977);  S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
32-23-1.2 (1978); VA. CODE S 18.2-267 (Supp. 1979); a n d  WIS. STAT. 
ANN. S 313.305(2)(a) (West Supp. 1979-80). In addition, D.C. CODE 
ANN. S 40-1002(b) (1973) could  b e  t e r m e d  a Tfpre l imlnary  b r e a t h  
t e s t f f  s t a t u t e  since ~t allows police officers t o  require tes ts  in cases 
where the  drlver is Involved in a fa ta l  or personal in jury  c r a s h  and  
is a r r e s t e d  fo r  a t r a f f l c  o f f e n s e  o t h e r  than DWI; the  t e s t  results 
could then be  Introduced a t  a subsequent DWI trlal. 
35. - S e e ,  e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.  95-1/2, S 11-501.l(a)(3) ( ~ m l t h - ~ u r d  
Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. S  169.123(3) ( w e s t  Supp. 1979); and  
VT. STAT. ANN. t l t .  23, S  1202(b) (1978). 
36. - S e e ,  e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE S 13353(a) ( w e s t  1971); a n d  MINN. 
STAT. ANN. S 169.123(2) (West Sup?. 1979). 
37. - See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. S  20-139.1(b) (1978). 
38. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  c o m p a r e  MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. SS 257.626, 
257.320a(l)(d) (1977) [ reck less  d r l v l n g  p u n i s h a b l e  b y  m a x i m u m  
p e n a l t i e s  of 90 days '  imprisonment or a $100 fine or both, plus six 
v ~ o l a t i o n  points]  wi th  - NIICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. S S  2 5 7 . 6 2 6 b ,  
2 5 7 . 3 2 0 a ( l ) ( e )  (1977)  [ c a r e l e s s  dr iving punishable  by maximum 
penalties of 10 days1 impr~sonment or a $100 f ~ n e  o r  b o t h ,  plus four  
39. - See , e.g., FLA. STAT. § 322.27 (1978); YIICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 
257.320a (1977); NEB. REV, STAT. S 39-669.26 (1974); a n d  P A .  
STAT. ANN. t i t .  75, S S  1535, 3362(c) (Purdon 1977). 
40. - See,  e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 5 8  487, 488 ( w e s t  1970) [ t h e f t  of 
over  $200 defined as grand thef t ;  thef t  of lesser amount considered 
petty] ; N.Y. PENAL LAW 4 5  130.25, 130.30, 130.35 ( ~ c K i n n e y  1975) 
[ s e t t i n g  o u t  t h r e e  d e g r e e s  of s t a t u t o r y  r a p e ,  de f ined  by a g e  of 
defendant and victim] ; and OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4)(f) (1977) 
[possession of m o r e  t h a n  o n e  ounce  of mar i juana  punishable  by 
impraonment; possession of smaller amount pun~shable by fine only]. 
41. Two s t a t e  s ta tutes  h a v e  decr imina l i zed  f ~ r s t  o f f e n s e  DWI. They  
are :  OR. REV. STAT. 99 484.360, 484.365(3)(a) (1977); and \US. 
STAT. ANN. 346,65(2)(a)(l) ,  939.12 ( w e s t  Supp. 1979-80). E v e n  
w h e r e  ~ r n p r ~ s o n m e n t  1s n o t  a posslble sanction, s t a t u t e s  may 
nevertheless a u t h o r ~ z e  a court to  sentence a convicted o f f e n d e r  t o  
P a r t l c l p a t e  In a r e h a b i l ~ t a t ~ o n  program. - See, MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. Si 257.907(4) (Supp. 1979-80) 
42. - S e e ,  e.g., Spr inger  v. Unlted States,  148 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1945); In -
r e  Mannino, 14 Cal.  App. 3d 953, 92 Cal.  Rp t r .  880 (1971); a n d  
Peop le  v. H ~ g g ~ n s ,  22 Mich. App. 479, 177 N.W.2d 716 (1970); but -
see,  S ta te  v. Sandoval, 92 Idaho 853, 452 P.2d 350 (1969). --
43. Runnels  v. Rosenda le ,  499 F.2d 733 (9 th  Clr .  1974); Mackey v. 
Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Clr. 1973); M e r r ~ k e n  v. Cressman ,  364 
F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
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